Capital Cartridge Ammunition


Capital Cartridge produces premium ammunition suitable for target shooting, competitions, and small game hunting. Their vast selection of calibers and bullet types ensures they have something perfect to meet any need.

At issue here is whether or not the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional Article III standing to pursue Adversary; further, their decision to revoke Stipulation and grant a Motion to Dismiss was unannounced and unexplained by them.

Legal Issues

Capital Cartridge is an established provider of ammunition for target shooting and small game hunting, featuring high-grade components manufactured under stringent quality control processes to meet the highest standards. Furthermore, Capital Cartridge offers a diverse selection of sizes, bullet types, and powder loads to meet shooters’ requirements–making them competitive with leading industry players in terms of choice and pricing.

Capital Cartridge asserted in its motion to dismiss that the Stipulation did not confer standing since it was an agreement between parties and not binding upon either. Capital Cartridge relied upon several cases, such as Lexmark and Estate of Spirtos, as support. However, the Court found these decisions not controlling and that their reasoning did not apply to derivative standing agreements under the Bankruptcy Code; furthermore, they were considered outlier opinions not indicative of current Ninth Circuit law.

The court’s decision to revoke the Stipulation was an extreme abuse of discretion that seriously undermined the Committee’s ability to bring an avoidance action on behalf of Debtors’ estates. Furthermore, the reasoning behind their changed ruling was neither detailed in hearing transcript nor the Dismissal Order and caused considerable consternation within both entities.

Lastly, the Court found that the Bankruptcy Court was not bound by its earlier decisions regarding Spaulding Composites and Parmetex because those cases involved claims under the Lanham Act and did not examine whether a debtor-in-possession could grant derivative standing to an unsecured creditor committee. Furthermore, these cases were decided before the 2005 BAPCPA amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, which did not alter the legality of derivative standing agreements.

Issa claims that the Bankruptcy Court made no error in granting his motion to dismiss as the Committee had standing to bring Adversary on behalf of Debtors’ estates. Furthermore, Issa contends that its decision not to give his motion for reconsideration was proper.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Motions to dismiss are formal requests made to a judge for him/her to dismiss a lawsuit brought by a plaintiff, usually at the beginning of litigation before the defendants have filed any other motions or answers. They often file such motions when they believe the plaintiff’s complaint lacks all the essential elements necessary to pursue legal claims or is groundless.

Judges often grant defendant’s motions to dismiss for various reasons. For example, if the plaintiff fails to allege all the essential elements of a legal claim or their injuries are non-measurable, then personal jurisdiction may not exist, or the suit doesn’t fall within the statute of limitation requirements, causing it to be dismissed by court order.

The Bankruptcy Court’s decision to reconsider and revoke the Stipulation Order and grant Capital Cartridge’s motion to dismiss was unsupported by evidence and abused discretion. Furthermore, no explanation was offered on how withdrawing it would benefit either Debtors’ estates or why revoking should be permitted.

Capital Cartridge’s claim that the Bankruptcy Court did not have jurisdiction to pursue Adversary was also without merit since whether a Committee has standing to pursue specific claims against target third parties is an issue of law that must be decided independently and reviewed de novo by any court. Furthermore, amending the Stipulation Order to confer derivative standing upon the Committee was another subject for de novo review by any court.

The Bankruptcy Court’s decision not to rely on Lexmark marks an unusual departure from Ninth Circuit’s practice of permitting derivative standing stipulations agreements. However, the Court finds no appropriateness in departing from this norm or questioning its interpretation of its authority to grant derivative standing to Committee members.

Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration

A motion for reconsideration is a legal filing that allows you to ask the court to reconsider its ruling in an area. Usually, this filing is necessary when there was either a legal error in their original ruling or new evidence has surfaced since their previous order was issued.

Courts may grant your motion for reconsideration if they believe there was either an obvious error or new circumstances that justify reconsideration, though you must meet strict standards to succeed. Consulting an attorney before filing will ensure it satisfies these requirements and that, if granted, it can lead to positive change.

In this case, the Committee asserts that the Bankruptcy Court misapplied its discretion by revoking and granting Capital Cartridge’s motion to dismiss Adversary Issa Issa; their change in position on derivative standing stipulations violated the law; they were also wrong in concluding Issa lacks standing because she is not their successor-in-interest and therefore cannot appeal the Dismissal and Reconsideration Orders.

A bankruptcy judge must carefully consider both the facts and relevant law when considering whether to grant your motion for relief. You are required to demonstrate that the judge made a clear error that would lead to apparent injustice for him, not overturn the previous ruling, and prove that the new evidence provided is relevant and material to your case. It is wise to consult a qualified attorney before considering this option as rules vary according to state; they can also offer guidance as to other available solutions you might have for your situation.

Defendant’s Appeal

Parties in this appeal differ on whether the Bankruptcy Court committed an error by revoking an approved derivative standing stipulation and granting Capital Cartridge’s dismissal motion. Issa contends that it was improper for the Court to do this as its Committee had direct Article III standing to pursue avoidance claims in its Adversary against Capital Cartridge; any reverse of said Stipulation was thus not required.

The dispute stems from eight companies simultaneously manufacturing, assembling, and selling small arms ammunition filing bankruptcy petitions. Although individual entities and debtors collaborated extensively throughout their respective proceedings, resulting in multiple issues that ultimately gave rise to this appeal.

Therefore, the Debtors agreed to grant derivative standing to the Committee so it could pursue specific claims against third-party target entities, and the Bankruptcy Court subsequently approved this stipulation.

To support its motion to dismiss, the Committee claimed that the law has changed since Ahcom et al. (623 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2010) and Estate of Spirtos (1999). Unfortunately, despite their duty to disclose controlling authorities adverse to them, such as Parmetex, they failed to do so; also, without explanation from the Court regarding why they decided to withdraw the Stipulation agreement and grant Capital Cartridge’s motion to dismiss.

However, the Court failed to explain why its assessment had changed when they previously held that Capital Cartridge Committee had Article III standing against Capital Cartridge to pursue avoidance claims for capital cartridge. Furthermore, no explanation was given for revoking the Stipulation that would benefit the Debtors’ estates.

Finally, the Court rejects Capital Cartridge’s arguments that the law has changed and that reversing the Stipulation would be appropriate. Lexmark differed significantly from Ahcom and Spirtos’ decisions by considering only whether an entity had prudential standing to sue on its behalf rather than whether there was legal standing to bring an antitrust suit against another party.